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ESSAY
LOCATING INNOVATION: THE ENDOGENEITY OF
TECHNOLOGY, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, AND
FINANCIAL CONTRACTING
RonaldJ Gilson*
There is much we do not understand about the "location" of innovation: the confluence, for a particular innovation, of the technology associated with the innovation; the innovatingfirm's size and organizational
structure; and the financial contracting that supports the innovation. This
Essay suggests that these three indicia are determined simultaneously and
discusses the interaction among them through four examples of innovative
activity whose location is characterizedby tradeoffs between pursuing the activity in an established company, in a smaller, earlier-stage company, or
some combination of the two. It first considers the dilemma faced by an
established company in deciding whether to keep an employee's innovation or
allow the employee to pursue the innovation through a startup. It next takes
up a very different relationship between an established company and an earlier-stage company: the development by the smaller company of a "disruptive" innovation that displaces the industry's dominant companies. This
Essay then considers an established company's instrumental use of the startup market to outsource development of a particularinnovation to a technology race. Finally, this Essay examines a form of innovation located between
an established and earlier-stage company: the pattern of joint ventures between large pharmaceuticalcompanies and smaller biotechnology companies.
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INTRODUCTION

There is much we do not understand about what I will call the "location" of innovation: the confluence, for a specific innovation, of the technology associated with the innovation; the size and organizational structure of the firm in which the innovation is pursued; and the financial
contracting that supports the innovation. Why do certain technologies
match with certain financial contracts and certain organizational structures? For example, why are innovative drugs increasingly developed
through joint ventures between capital-heavy large pharmaceutical companies ("pharmas") and smaller but technologically savvy biotechnology
("biotech") firms, rather than completely within large pharmas? Also,
why did so much of Cisco's 1990s development of networking infrastructure take place through the acquisition and quick integration of hundreds of startup firms with relevant premarket technologies? Why didn't
Cisco itself simply develop those technologies? The same questions arise
with respect to the location of any innovation, including those with the
highest public profile: venture capital-backed startups, which have given
rise to companies such as Intel, Apple, and Google.
The gaps in our knowledge are not from lack of effort. Few matters
of commerce have so captured the energy and resources of so many in
business, academia, and government. This attention is unsurprising; after all, innovation represents the source of future economic growth and,
in a global economy, holds the prospect of economic success based on
something other than wage competition. And, indeed, we have much to
show for these efforts. For example, there is now extensive literature analyzing the financial contracting forms associated with venture capital and
the organizational structure of both venture capital funds and the startups in which they invest.' There are also assessments of the conditions
1. The literature began with a flurry of groundbreaking studies by Paul Gompers and
Joshua Lerner, writing together and separately. This work is compiled and extended in
Paul Gompers & josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (2d ed. 2004). Steven Kaplan
and Per Str6mberg extended this work by analyzing a data set of 213 venture capital
investment contracts. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial Contracting Theory
Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 281, 281 (2003) ("In this paper, we attempt to inform theory by describing in detail
the contracts between VCs [venture capitalists] and entrepreneurs."). More recently,
Amar Bhid6 has broadly examined the effect of globalization on domestic venture capital
financing. Amar Bhid6, The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity
in a More Connected World (2008).
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necessary to the success of the venture capital market,2 and the potential
role for the government in creating such a market.3 This literature is
characterized by a vibrant interaction between theory and empirical investigation, with the particular advantage that investigators have worked
directly with actual transaction documents. 4 Theory is brought to bear
on what those individuals and firms engaged in innovative work actually
do, and how the organizations that pursue innovation are actually
structured.5
But venture capital, while certainly important in its own right, is just
a drop in the innovation bucket. In 2006, the four largest U.S. corporate
research and development (R&D) programs alone invested more than
five times what the entire U.S. venture capital industry put into seed,
early-stage, and startup investments, the areas where the focus on innovation is most intense.6 And even large R&D programs do not capture the
full picture of the location of innovation. Indeed, we see R&D carried
out in a virtual Cambrian explosion of organizational forms. In addition
to venture capital and the in-house research efforts of major companies,
innovation is at the core of, among others, angel-financed startups operating earlier in the life cycle than venture capital is available; 7 joint ven2. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & RonaldJ. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47J. Fin. Econ. 243 (1998) and sources cited
therein.
3. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Engineering
Market] and sources cited therein.
4. See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, supra note 1, at 30 ("[W]e examine compensation
terms in 419 venture partnership agreements and offering memoranda for funds formed
between 1978 and 1992."); Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 1, at 281 (explaining each
venture capital firm studied provided "contractual agreements governing each financing
round in which the firm participated" and, if available, "the company's business plan,
internal analyses evaluating the investment, and information on subsequent
performance").
5. See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, supra note 1, at 127-54; Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra
note 1, at 281-82.
6. In 2006, total U.S. seed, startup, and early-stage venture capital investments
amounted to some $5.5 billion. PricewaterhouseCoopers & Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n,
Money Tree Report, available at https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/
nav.jsp?page=historical (select "startup/seed" for "stage"; then select "early stage" for
"stage"; then add all figures) (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). The combined 2006 R&D spending of Pfizer, Ford, Johnson & Johnson, and
Microsoft was approximately $30 billion. Barry Jaruzelski & Kevin Dehoff, The Customer
Connection: The Global Innovation 1000, at 10 (2007), available at http://www.strategybusiness.com/media/file/sb49_07407.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
The attraction of venture capital-based companies is in their disproportionate success
in innovation. See Samuel Kortum &JoshLerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture
Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. Econ. 674, 691-92 (2000) (reporting venture capitalbacked companies produced close to three times their proportional amount of patents
based on R&D spending).
7. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors,
61 Vand. L. Rev. 1405, 1416-20, 1452 (2008); Brent D. Goldfarb et al., Does Angel
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tures between large companies that combine research efforts in a particular field; 8 joint ventures between large and small companies, especially
prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry;9 and collaborative innovation
between adjacent parties in the vertical supply chain.' 0
While each of these individual examples has been the object of academic attention, they have by and large been treated separately, as standalone silos of innovation rather than as different solutions to the same
overall problem. The features of each location are mapped, but less attention is paid to why particular types of innovative activity take place in
different locations corresponding to different combinations of technology, the organizational structure in which the technology is developed,
and the financing mode. In this preliminary framing of the problem, I
will suggest that technology, organizational structure, and financing are
determined simultaneously, each dependent on the others. In this sense,
in the location of innovation, there is no independent variable.
My approach to this problem is found at the "T" intersection of (1)
Ronald Coase; (2) Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller; and (3) Oliver
Williamson and the property rights literature initiated by Sanford
Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore. Coase tells us that frictions determine the organizational location of productive activities: Whether a
product will be produced entirely within a single company or whether
elements of it will be acquired by contract across a market is determined
by the transaction costs (particularly the cost of information) associated
with the alternative modes of production. In the absence of frictions, the
organizational form in which an innovative activity is carried out is irrelevant to firm value-all silos are the same."1

Participation Matter? An Analysis of Early Venture Financing 3 (Roger H. Smith Sch. of
Bus., Working Paper No. RHS-06-072, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1024186 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting study results indicating
firms financed by angel investors alone are more likely to survive than other firms).
8. For example, Pioneer Hi-Bred, a developer of bio-engineered seed stock, and
DuPont, a leading producer of plant pesticides, combined large parts of their research
efforts in ajoint venture focused on developing genetically engineered seeds. Bloomberg
News, DuPont to Invest $1.7 Billion in Pioneer Hi-Bred, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1997, at D3.
9. See, e.g., David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Financial Contracting in Biotech
Strategic Alliances, 50 J.L. & Econ. 559, 559-60 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Stuart,
Financial Contracting] (describing pharmaceutical joint ventures between small biotech
companies and mature pharmas).
10. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 431,
450-58 (2009). Even the examples given are limited to commercial locations of
innovations; university and government-based research projects are not mentioned.
11. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390-91 (1937).
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Modigliani and Miller, 12 reframed in the spirit of Coase,1 3 tell us that
frictions also determine a firm's capital structure-how the assets on the
left side of the balance sheet are financed by the contributions on the
right-and the terms of the financial contract associated with particular
capital structure instruments. 14 In the absence of transaction costs, the
particular sources of financing and the financial contract that governs
their provision also are irrelevant to firm value.
Williamson steps behind the no-transaction-costs veil and addresses
the types of transaction costs that shape organizational structure and financial contracting in the real world, where frictions are pervasive and
information is costly and unequally distributed among the necessary parties. When information differentials are combined with specific investment, the potential for opportunism-"self-interest seeking with guile" as
Williamson puts it-arises.1 5 Grossman, Hart, and Moore build on the
contract theory literature to explain firm boundaries (the distribution of
asset ownership) as a means to address problems of incomplete contracting motivated by information problems, and the financial structure
that supports asset ownership. 16
12. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958) [hereinafter Modigliani &
Miller, Cost of Capital].
13. Coase was explicit that liability's location was irrelevant only in a transaction-costfree world; his point was that because the world was so messy, the study of frictions should
be at the core of the agenda. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & Econ. 1, 43
(1960). Miller reports having the same point in mind. Writing thirty years after the
irrelevancy propositions were first published, Modigliani & Miller, Cost of Capital, supra
note 12, Miller stated that "[Il]ooking back now, perhaps we should have put more
emphasis on the other, upbeat side of the 'nothing matters' coin: showing what doesn't
matter can also show, by implication, what does." Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller
Propositions After Thirty Years, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1988, at 99, 100 [hereinafter Miller,
The Modigliani-Miller Propositions]. Of course, that implication drove a significant
research agenda in financial economics over the thirty years following its publication. See,
e.g., Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 Handbook of
Industrial Organization 61, 78-86 (Richard Schmalansee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
14. As Miller put it in 1988, capital structure irrelevance was simply "an implication of
equilibrium in perfect capital markets." Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions, supra
note 13, at 99.
15. Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 47 (1985) (defining
opportunism).
16. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 693-95 (1986); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119,
1152-53 (1990) ("[W]e have ignored issues having to do with the dissemination of
information and with how coordination takes place between individuals with different
sources of information but possibly similar goals. . . . [W]e believe that our analysis has
identified some of the forces determining the boundaries of the firm."). Both the
transaction cost and property rights literatures are surveyed in Francine Lafontaine &
Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. Econ.
Literature 629, 649-62 (2007).
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As framed by the complementary irrelevancy propositions, the location of innovation-each combination of technology, organizational
form, and financial contracting that defines a characteristic pattern of
investment in innovation-reflects a particular combination of transaction and information costs that tie the organizational form (Coase) and
financial contracting (Modigliani and Miller) to the particular technology. We can explain the variety of innovative activities across organizational structure and financial contracts, then, as the interaction of endogenous variables: Technology influences informational asymmetries and
transaction costs, which in turn-theory tells us-influence organizational form. A fully formulated account should therefore be able to predict which forms of innovation generally will take place, for example,
within startup companies financed by venture capital, within the research
labs of existing large companies, or through cooperation among separate
entities.' 7
The goal here is to contribute to the understanding of innovative
activity distribution across different types of organizations, in different
industries, and using different financial contracts. My ambition at this
initial stage of a very large undertaking is limited. I will consider a small
segment of the three-dimensional locational distribution of innovation.
Figure One illustrates the relationship between each dimension: A particular innovation is developed in a setting that reflects a particular combination of technology, organizational structure, and financial
contracting.
Each of the four examples I use represents a different set of transaction and information costs underlying the three determinants of the innovation's location. Thus, the result is not a continuum, since each location represents not a linear relationship between two factors, but
something three-dimensional. The transaction costs associated with technology, organization, and finance combine to dictate, for example, the
need for and ability to design intense incentives, the capacity of managers
and investors to monitor the objects of those incentives with comparable
intensity,' 8 and the level of information costs that influences the parties'
ability to determine their counterparties' characteristics in financing an
innovation. The transaction costs also dictate the observability and verifiability of opportunistic behavior and the array of factors necessary to
support a reputation market that both supplements and supports the explicit contracts between innovative capital providers and those needing
17. Sharon Belenzon, Tomer Berkovitz, and Patrick Bolton make a similar point,
stressing a Coasean perspective in assessing the allocation of R&D between business groups
and conglomerates. Sharon Belenzon et al., Intracompany Governance and Innovation
23-37 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W15304, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463897 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
18. Paul Milgrom &John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 221-28
(1992) [hereinafter Milgrom & Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management]
(discussing correlation between incentive and monitoring intensity).
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FIGuRE 1: THE INNOVATIVE PLANE
Financial Contracting

Technology

Organizational
Structure
capital. All of these factors, in turn, determine the actual location of particular innovative activity.
Here I take up four clusters of innovative activity characterized by
tradeoffs between pursuing an innovation in an established company, a
smaller earlier-stage company, or some combination of the two. Part I
considers the dilemma faced by an established company in deciding
whether to retain an employee's innovation or to stand back and allow
the employee to pursue the innovation in a startup company backed by
third-party venture capital. In light of the advantages held by an established company, the question is why we ever see startups in this situation.
Part II then addresses a very different relationship between an established
company and an early-stage company: the early-stage company's development of an innovation that "disrupts" existing industry patterns by devaluing the skills and experience of the industry's dominant companies.
Here we confront the question of "organizational ambidexterity": Can
the same organization and financing arrangements successfully support
development of the dominant technology while simultaneously supporting development of the technology that will supplant the dominant technology and devalue the organization's expertise associated with it? Part
III takes up an established company's instrumental use of the startup
market-that is, the company's decision to outsource the development of
particular innovations to a technology race between startup and early-
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stage companies, with the intention of acquiring the race's winner. Finally, Part IV addresses a form of innovation located somewhere between
a large and small company: the pattern of joint ventures between large
pharmas and small, earlier-stage biotech firms through which a growing
amount of pharmaceutical research takes place.
Of course, focusing on these four clusters affecting established and
early-stage companies ignores other locations that account for a large
proportion of total innovation. Most important, it ignores the research
labs of established companies, where research is financed by cash flow
and the company's credit, and is organized within an existing corporate
structure. For now, however, these four examples, which illustrate the
complexity of the locational decision even within the narrow choice of
the host entity's size and maturity, are sufficient to demonstrate the value
of a comparative analysis that helps explain how technology, organizational structure, and financial contracting combine to influence the location of innovation.
I should also note that the interaction between technology, organizational structure, and financing underlying the innovative activity highlighted here is preliminary, with no small risk of apophenia. In this respect, it is something of a five-finger exercise, proposing rough
hypotheses for what appear to be regularities among the attributes associated with the locations of different innovative activity. The taxonomy
thus invites both expansion to other regions of the innovation threedimensional space, and further analytic and empirical testing of the hypothesized relationships, which may then falsify some of the hypotheses
and refine others. Nevertheless, I am far more confident that the premise that gives rise to the effort is correct: We will not understand where
innovation takes place-in which organizations and with what kind of financing-without understanding the endogeneity of the innovative technology, the financial contracting that feeds it, and the industrial organization that supports it.
Two final introductory matters remain to be considered, the first a
qualification and the second a further justification of the effort. The
qualification concerns the static character of the analysis, in which fixed
clusters of characteristics place innovative activity at fixed locations. Of
course, innovation and its organizational shelter and financing are dynamic, not static; endogeneity itself implies the prospect of change. Venture capital, for example, is much different and much more important
than it was when American Research and Development, the first venture
capital fund, was conceived immediately following World War 11.19 The
capital market has changed, transaction and information costs have
changed, and the technologies that must be financed have changed.
19. See David H. Hsu & Martin Kenney, Organizing Venture Capital: The Rise and
Demise of American Research & Development Corporation, 1946-1973, at 14 Indus. &
Corp. Change 579, 580 (2005).
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Rather than a point in three-dimensional space, perhaps the better metaphor is the three wheels on a slot machine, one for technology, one for
organizational structure, and one for financing, each turning independently and at different speeds, that coincide for a time, until the lever is
pulled again. Nonetheless, by understanding how the characteristics interact in their present alignment, we learn something about how future
changes will affect the organizational outcome.
This above point concerns the normative, rather than the positive,
payoff to the analysis. Professionals, often (but not limited to) lawyers,
design organizational form and financial contracts. I have elsewhere referred to such professionals in general, and business lawyers in particular,
as "transaction cost engineers."20 The original structure of venture capital arrangements in Silicon Valley-the venture capital limited partnership that defines the arrangement between investors and venture capital
professionals, the range of agreements between the venture capital fund
and the portfolio company, and the fit between the two contractual relationshipS21-was the product of lawyers engineering a structure that accommodated their clients' needs.2 2 Precisely because of the endogeneity
of technology, organizational form, and financial contracting, as well as
the dynamic character of innovation, positive theory helps transaction
professionals structure the arrangements through which innovation takes
place. Put differently, some combination of other people, other entities,
and someone else's money stand between an innovator's idea and an innovation reaching the market. Engineering those arrangements is not
the only thing business lawyers do, but it is perhaps the most interesting.
Understanding the endogeneity of the location of innovation will help
lawyers do it better. 23
20. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 243 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation].
21. See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, supra note 1, at 65-90 (providing extended analysis
of current research); Gilson, Engineering Market, supra note 3, at 1070-76 (detailing
structure).
22. See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and
the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 679, 690-91
(1996) (exploring role of lawyers in developing venture capital structure); Mark C.
Suchman, The Contracting Universe: Law Firms and the Evolution of Venture Capital
Financing in Silicon Valley 31-33 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/
~suchman/drafts/kuniverse.web.pdf (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (same).
23. Recently, a number of articles have taken aim at the characterization of a lawyer's
role reflected in the text above. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as
Enterprise Architects, 64 Bus. Law. 279, 286-95 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the
Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 Stan.J.L. Bus. & Fin. 486, 487, 498-99 (2007). While
I am flattered that this formulation of a business lawyer's role still commands attention
after twenty-five years, the thrust of the criticism warrants comment. First, commentators
suggest that applying theory to engineer the organizations and contracts of innovation is
only one, perhaps small, part of a transaction lawyer's role. In short, as Professor Dent puts
it, my approach-what he calls the "received model"-"is too narrow." Dent, supra, at 281.
He has in mind "a fuller vision showing that business lawyers perform a greater range of
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STARTUPS? THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF INTENSE INCENTIVES IN
ESTABLISHED AND STARTUP COMPANIES

The classic Silicon Valley story involves an engineer leaving an established company with no more than an idea and determination, securing
venture capital, and becoming fabulously wealthy either through an initial public offering or a sale of the company. As Willie Nelson sang, in
the United States, our "heroes have always been cowboys." 24 Startup entrepreneurs are the cowboys of the high-tech world. The puzzle, however, is why we ever observe them.
Understanding the existence of startups illustrates the endogeneity
of financing, technology, and organizational structure. There is a logic to
why innovative technology conceived of by large-company engineers may
become the crown jewel of venture capitalists. The technology, the organizational structure of the small firm, and the staged financing offered by
venture capitalists are endogenous variables. Each component tells a vital
piece of this story.
As a starting point, one might expect that innovation would be located largely within established firms. Such firms have a number of inherent advantages. External financing of high-risk future growth options
is extremely expensive; the information asymmetry between capital providers and the funded company should make internal financing a far
cheaper alternative. 25 Moreover, a successful company that knows its customers and its industry should have better information than a new firm
about what industry customers want now and, perhaps more important,
what they will want in the future. As a result, their capital budgeting for
activities using a larger set of skills than in the received model." Id. Second, the critics
point out, as did I, that other professions can do the very same thing. I agree with both
points. Compare Schwarcz, supra, at 487 (arguing "the same types of value ... could be
added in business transactions by any sophisticated party, not necessarily one specially
trained as a lawyer"), with Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 20, at 295 ("There is nothing
traditionally 'legal' about the role I have described business lawyers as playing, nor are
there any special requirements peculiar to lawyers necessary to play this role."). Business
lawyers do many other things; transaction engineering is merely the most interesting and
challenging. However, I take the broader theme of my now slightly dated claim to be
largely accepted by the commentators, and I would happily substitute the following for the
received model: A lawyer creates value by taking serious theory developed elsewhere in
academia and bringing it to bear on the practice of law. Much theory has been developed
since I wrote in 1984. For instance, the notion of teaching law students the tools to create
value has given rise to successful courses in "Deals" at Columbia, Stanford, and the
University of Pennsylvania Law Schools, among others. On occasion, these courses are
taught jointly by the law school and business school. See Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing
Corporate Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 475,
490-92 (discussing Deals courses).
24. Willie Nelson, My Heroes Have Always Been Cowboys, on Soundtrack: The
Electric Horseman (Columbia Records 1984).
25. See Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39J. Fin. 575, 589-90 (1984)
(describing how cost of capital is function of information asymmetries).
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supporting innovation should be less error-prone. 2 6 To the extent R&D
will lead to extensions of existing products or markets, innovation by established companies should benefit from economies of scale or scopefor example, shared production, distribution, and marketing facilities, as
well as the opportunity for shared general overhead expenses-that cannot be duplicated by a startup. Finally, the U.S. tax code subsidizes R&D
by existing successful companies by allowing losses from failed attempts at
innovation to offset otherwise taxable income from other activities. 27
Since startups have no other income against which their losses from a
particular project may be set off, the government in effect gives established companies with a stable source of income an R&D tax subsidy that
is not available to a startup entity.
And yet, significant innovation does occur within these seemingly
disadvantaged startup or early-stage companies. 28 This Part takes up the
puzzle by assessing the relative advantages and disadvantages of mature
and startup companies. The conclusion is that mature employer companies rationally choose to let some employees with valuable innovations
leave for startups.
A. Why Startups?
To see why any innovation takes place within startups, it is helpful to
characterize the venture capital process as an auction: The employee innovator offers to sell an ownership interest in the intellectual property
represented by her innovation.29 While venture capital firms can participate in the auction, so too can the employer. And on a first cut, the
employer should always win because the opportunity should be worth
more to the employer, for the reasons discussed below.3 0
The employer's first advantage is more favorable tax treatment. As
stated above, in the United States an investment made by an established
company that has past income and can expect future income is subject to
symmetric tax treatment: Gains are taxed, and losses are offset through
beneficial tax reductions. Since innovation is risky, the ability to reduce
26. Part III, infra, takes up a circumstance when the established firm will be at a
disadvantage.
27. See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289,
293-95 (1999) (reviewing tax treatment of startups).
28. Research shows that such companies, fueled by venture capital, produced almost
three times their proportional number of patents relative to their share of overall R&D
spending in the first decade of the venture capital boom. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 6,
at 675.
29. This formulation assumes that the engineer, rather than the employer, has the
property rights in the idea, despite the fact that the innovation was typically conceived
while the engineer was an employee. For a discussion of the engineer's property rights, see
RonaldJ. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 597-609 (1999)
(discussing legal protections of employee knowledge and inventions).
30. Part L.A draws on Bankman & Gilson, supra note 27.
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taxes by the amount of losses from unsuccessful efforts is significant. In
contrast, the startup's future tax treatment is asymmetric: While gains are
taxed, losses provide no tax benefit because the failed startup has no past
income and will have no future income.Y
The employer also has a range of informational advantages. If the
innovation has some relation to the employer's business-a reasonable
assumption given the innovation's development during the employee's
tenure-the employer should have better information than a venture
capital firm about the innovator's talents, the innovation itself, and the
potential market. Writ large, the argument reflects the pecking order
theory of capital structure: 32 The spread between the costs of internal
and external capital will increase as the information asymmetry between
the company and providers of outside capital (like the venture capitalists)
increases.
Finally, as previously noted, the employer's informational advantage
shades into scope and scale economies. To the extent that the innovation complements the employer's business, commercialization of the innovation can benefit from shared customers, distribution channels and
marketing, and perhaps some elements of manufacturing.
So why do we ever observe startups? Under these circumstances,
something about the transaction and information costs of both the established employer and the venture capital-backed startup's organizational
structure must result in efficiency advantages for the startup form that
offsets the employers' tax, informational, scale, and scope advantages.
There are two categories of explanations for the presence of startup ventures: first, problems that the employer has in taking advantage of the
innovation, and second, advantages of the venture capital-backed startup
form. In the case of startups, the technology favors locating the innovation in the employer; however, that advantage is trumped by the transaction and information cost differences between a large established employer and a single project startup.
B. Problems with Employer Implementation
The literature identifies a range of problems with employer implementation of the employee's innovation. Because these problems would
not burden a startup, venture capitalists can often outbid employers in
the metaphorical auction for innovations. A number of scholars have focused on the risk to the employee of merely disclosing the innovation; by
doing so, the employee will compromise her intellectual property. The
danger that the employer will misappropriate the innovation if it is disclosed in order to "bid" against the venture capitalist may cause the employee to favor a startup even if the innovation would be worth more if
31. The tax analysis is set out in more detail in Bankman & Gilson, supra note 27, at
293-95.
32. See Myers, supra note 25, at 581-85 (describing pecking order theory).
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implemented by the employer.3 3 Presumably, the venture capitalist does
not present a misappropriation risk.
Although neither is wholly satisfactory, two elements arguably reduce
the potential that the venture capitalist will misappropriate an innovation
disclosed in a submitted business plan. The first, and less significant, is
that because the venture capitalist is not an operating company, it has less
reason than the employer to misappropriate the innovation: The employer can use the innovation in its own business, while the venture capitalist cannot. This analysis ignores, however, the fact that the particular
startup will not be the venture capitalist's only investment. Even though
the venture capitalist cannot itself use the employee's innovation, it will
have ongoing investments in other startups, to which the employee's innovation might be valuable. The temptation to profit from misappropriated innovation by giving it to another portfolio company-in which, because of multiple financing rounds, the venture capitalist has a much
larger investment-provides the venture capitalist a motive for misappropriation, especially if the venture capitalist has a specialized portfolio that
overlaps with the innovator's technology.
The second and more persuasive protection against venture capitalists misappropriating an employee's innovation is that venture capitalists
operate in a reputation market.3 4 Venture capital markets are local, and
rich information about venture capitalists' conduct spreads very quickly.
As a result, misappropriating an innovation in the course of its evaluation
would be punished in the venture capital market.3 5 But while more plausible, this explanation exaggerates the difference in position between the
employer and the venture capitalist. Employers also are constrained by a
reputation market, albeit an internal one.
Although it is not misleading to frame the employee's decision to
pursue her innovation through a startup as an auction, it also is important to realize the limits of the metaphor. The employer actually bids for
a portion of the employee's innovation not ex post through a venture
capital-like bid when the innovating employee has decided to leave, but
ex ante through the company's incentive compensation structure. For
example, the employer's compensation structure may contemplate that
an innovative employee receives an equity participation in an employer
33. Most of the literature addresses the misappropriation problem not with respect to
the employer company, but with respect to the prospect of corporate venture capital-for
example, the innovating employee taking financing from Microsoft rather than a
traditional venture capitalist. See, e.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Start-ups, Spinoffs, and Internal Projects, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 362, 370-71 (1995) (analyzing risk of
Here the concern is with
misappropriation through competitor financing).
misappropriation that occurs through the corporate investor's post-financing involvement
with the portfolio company. In the case of the employee/employer interaction, the feared
misappropriation takes place through pre-bid disclosure.
34. Gilson, Engineering Market, supra note 3, at 1092.
35. See id. (discussing operation of reputation market in connection with venture
capital).
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subsidiary-"intrapreneurship"-if she has a great idea. She may also receive a large bonus. The employer misappropriates the innovation by not
making the anticipated payoff. But the employer, just like the venture
capitalist, is a repeat player in an information-rich context, and the conditions necessary for an internal reputation market concerning the treatment of employee innovations will also operate to constrain misappropriation.3 6 Thus, the argued difference between an employer's and venture
capitalist's incentives to misappropriate is overstated.
The more persuasive barriers to the employer's bidding to retain an
employee's innovation come when the costs of internal conflicts outweigh
the benefits of the innovation. Thomas Hellmann has argued that employees whose positions would be threatened by the innovation may act
to undermine its further development.3 7 In a related vein, Paul Milgrom
and John Roberts note that there are opportunity costs when employees
divert their efforts from productive activities to protecting their positions
by trying to influence company decisionmakers against the innovation.3 8
If these opportunity costs are sufficiently high, the employer will prefer to
push the "threatening" innovation out the door and into the hands of
waiting venture capitalists.
Finally, Bankman and Gilson highlight the measurement problems
that flow from giving employees a powerful incentive to develop the innovation.39 In order for an internal incentive to reward innovative employees, the employer must identify, after the fact, the employees to whom an
innovation belongs. The necessity of allocating an innovation's ownership may have significant costs. To see the problem, assume that R&D is
most efficiently carried out in teams. Further assume that the research
process has economies of scope-there is a benefit from continuously
sharing research among teams-and that the more ongoing research is
36. In the context of the labor market, the role of a reputation market is framed in
terms of "implicit contracts." For a model in which employer misappropriation is central
to the process, see generally Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, Curb Your
Innovation: On the Relationship Between Innovation and Governance Structure (N.Y.U.
Stern Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-06-010, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1291578 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
37. Thomas Hellmann, A Theory of Corporate Venture Investing 5-7 (Stanford Univ.
Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1452, 1998), available at http://
strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/hellmann/pdfs/tcorpven.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
38. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in
Organizations, 94 Am. J. Soc. S154, S156-57 (1988) [hereinafter Milgrom & Roberts,
Economic Approach]. Bengt Holmstr6m stresses differential measurement and
monitoring costs between innovation and other employee activities. If measuring the
employee's efforts at innovation is more difficult than measuring her efforts in more
routine activities, it may be desirable to restrict the employee's activities. Bengt
Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 305, 311-12 (1989);
Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7J.L. Econ. & Org. (Special Issue) 24, 25-26
(1991).
39. Bankman & Gilson, supra note 27, at 301-03.
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shared, the more difficult it is for any single individual or team to establish property rights in a single invention. Under these circumstances, employees have a powerful incentive to perfect their property rights by
hoarding research results, a strategy that will be costly to the employer for
at least two reasons. First, any time spent on concealment reduces the
time the employee spends on productive activities. Second, and more
important, this concealment restricts economies of scope by reducing
other employees' productivity, since their performance would have been
better had information been shared rather than hoarded.
So what is an employer to do? Both the benefits and costs of the
employer's bid-its internal incentive system that rewards innovative employees-increase with the intensity of the incentive. The higher the incentive, the more employees will turn the innovation over to the employer rather than found a startup. But the higher the incentive, the
more employees are motivated to hoard research to protect their property rights, and the larger the cost the employer's bidding imposes on its
overall R&D effort. In equilibrium, the employer will set the intensity of
the incentive at the point where the costs to the entire research effort
associated with the increase in incentives necessary to keep one additional employee are higher than the expected value from one more retained innovation. At the margin, some innovative employees leave for
startups, while others remain in-house. 4 0 This outcome is consistent with
observed experience: Established technology companies both perform
substantial amounts of innovation and lose employees to startups. 41
The outcome also is consistent with another observation concerning
the distribution of innovation between established companies and startups. One would expect that established companies are best suited to
incremental innovation, while startups are better at discontinuous innovation. This is due in part to the lower payoffs to, and consequently more
limited external financial market for, incremental innovation. Thus, established companies need to offer less intense internal incentives to retain incrementally innovative employees. But it is also due to the reduction in the influence costs, identified by Milgrom and Roberts, 42 and a
40. John Roberts reports how 3M tried to manage innovation in the face of the
incentive problems raised in the text: "Performance measurement for subgroups or
individuals, however, tended to involve subjective evaluations or milestones achieved, not
the financial numbers generated. Rewards had large non-monetary elements, especially
personal autonomy and professional recognition . . . ." John Roberts, The Modern Firm
259 (2004). In other words, 3M dramatically reduced the intensity of the incentives.
41. The time it takes to go from being an early-stage company to an established
employer concerned about losing innovative employees to startups seems to be shrinking.
See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Google Searches for Ways to Keep Big Ideas at Home, Wall St. J.,
June 18, 2009, at BI ("Google Inc. is revamping how it develops and prioritizes new
products, giving employees a pipeline to the company's top brass amid worries about
losing its best people and promising ideas to start-ups.").
42. See Milgrom & Roberts, Economic Approach, supra note 38, at S156-57
(enumerating costs imposed on organizations by members' "influence activities").
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corresponding reduction in the innovation hoarding that results from
the need to perfect property rights in the innovation.
Masahiko Aoki makes this point in an interesting way.4 3 Aoki stresses
that the genius ofJapanese manufacturing is the enormous emphasis on
teamwork and information sharing, both horizontally and vertically.
Such sharing is the opposite of employee property rights perfection associated with the intense incentives necessary to retain the innovations that
otherwise would migrate to venture-backed startups. The Japanese result-counterintuitive by American standards-is supported by low intensity incentives: a commitment to lifetime employment and lockstep compensation. Aoki argues that these low intensity incentives encourage
employees to invest in firm-specific human capital, and not to hoard information at the expense of other teams and the firm's capacity to receive
and use new information. Aoki also notes, however, that these attributes
make the Japanese system very effective when innovation is incremental,
as in process innovation, and not very effective when innovation is discontinuous and powerful incentives matter much more. 4 4 Thus, the balance
is sensitive not only to organizational structure and incentives, but also to
the character of the technology associated with an innovation. As argued
above, organizational structure and technology are simultaneously determined. In Japan, the organizational structure of flat hierarchies and the
"technology" of process innovation illustrate the endogeneity hypothesis.
The nature of structural incentives in established companies and venturebacked startups do the same. 45
C. Advantages of Startups
So far we have focused on the factors that influence the size of the
employer's bid to retain an employee with an innovative technology. We
turn now to the determinants of the venture capitalist's bid. What are the
43. Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ.
Literature 1 (1990).
44. Id. at 9. Peter Hall and David Soskice make a similar point but extend the analysis
to include a discussion of how the Japanese political structure complements the
organizational structure of larger incrementally innovative companies. Peter A. Hall &
David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in Varieties of Capitalism: The
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 1, 50-51 (Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice eds., 2001).
45. While the text does not refer to the role of financial contracting within the
Japanese firm, Aoki stresses the role of the Japanese banks as the primary source of
industrial capital during the period when his description was most accurate. Aoki, supra
note 43, at 14. Put briefly, the banks provided a buffer from market forces that would have
destabilized the incentive structure at the heart of the structure of the Japanese firm. See
Hugh Patrick, The Relevance of Japanese Finance and Its Main Bank System, in The
Japanese Main Bank System 353, 388-408 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994)
(discussing lessons from Japanese post-war financial development); Juro Teranishi, Loan
Syndication in War-Time Japan and the Origins of the Main Bank System, in TheJapanese
Main Bank System, supra, at 51, 79 (noting ties between Japanese banks and
conglomerates insulated managers from market forces).

2010]

LOCATING INNOVATION

901

value consequences of developing the innovation within a venture capital-backed startup?4 6
Here we benefit from a large literature that addresses the financial
contract between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company,4 7 and
the fit between that contract and the financial contract between the venture capital fund and its investors. All financial contracts respond to
three central problems: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
costs. In early-stage technology financing, these three problems are
presented in extreme form. The early stage of the venture magnifies uncertainty; almost all important decisions concerning the company remain
to be made, and all of its value depends on uncertain future growth.
That uncertainty expands the information asymmetries between the investor and the entrepreneur: The entrepreneur's intentions and abilities
are less observable than actions already taken and the actual operation of
a business, neither of which is available for many entrepreneurs seeking
venture financing. And because the entrepreneur's interest in a startup
funded by venture capital is fairly characterized as an option, in some
circumstances there will be significant agency costs: The entrepreneur's
interests and those of the capital provider will sharply diverge, especially
with respect to post-financing decisions concerning the duration and riskiness of the venture.
The organizational and contractual structure of the U.S. venture capital market responds directly to this trio of problems. That response also
influences the difference between an innovation's value if developed
within a venture capital-backed startup or developed within an established company. For our purposes, one characteristic of this response is
critical: Very powerful incentives for all participants-investors in venture
capital funds, general partners of the funds, and entrepreneurs-are coupled with very intense monitoring of entrepreneurs by venture capitalists,
and monitoring of venture capitalists by the capital market.48
Consider first the incentives for the entrepreneur-our engineer
leaving her employer with an innovation in mind. The first element of
the entrepreneur's incentive structure comes from the fact that the initial
venture capital investment typically will be insufficient to fund the startup
company's entire business plan. The investment will instead be "staged."
A particular investment round will provide only the capital the business
plan projects as necessary to achieve specified milestones set out in the

46. This section draws on Gilson, Engineering Market, supra note 3.
47. See supra note 1.
48. This is consistent with Milgrom and Roberts' "monitoring intensity principle,"
which predicts that because intense incentives give rise not only to incentives to perform
but also to incentives to cheat, intense incentives require a significant investment in
monitoring. Milgrom & Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management, supra note 18,
at 226-27.
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business plan. 49 While first round investors expect to participate in subsequent investment rounds,5 0 typically they are not contractually obligated to do so even if the business plan's milestones are met; the terms of
later rounds of investment are negotiated at the time the milestones are
met, and the prior investment exhausted. The result is to give the venture capitalist the power to decide whether the project (and the startup
company) goes forward. This structure gives the entrepreneur a powerful incentive to perform, while also giving the venture capitalist the
means to monitor that performance.
The powerful incentive provided by staged financing also reduces
the information asymmetry between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur concerning the entrepreneur's talents. Every incentive has an
information-related flipside that responds to adverse selection problems.
In deciding which startups to finance, the venture capital fund has to
distinguish between good and bad entrepreneurs under circumstances in
which an entrepreneur has better information about her own skills than
does the investor. Because the incentive created by staged financing is
more valuable to a good entrepreneur than a bad one, an entrepreneur's
willingness to accept an intense incentive is a signal of the entrepreneur's
less visible skills. The signal is particularly important for early-stage and
high-tech portfolio companies because the absence of a performance history and the technical nature of the projects make the entrepreneur's
skills particularly difficult to observe.5 1 In comparison, the entrepreneur's employer will have had substantial opportunity to observe her performance. To some extent, the screening function of the venture capital
incentive structure overcomes some of the employer's informational
advantage.
The entrepreneur next faces the portfolio company's compensation
system. Perhaps more starkly than with any other organizational or contractual technique, the portfolio company's compensation structure creates extremely high-powered performance incentives that serve to align
the incentives of the portfolio company management and the venture
49. See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of
Venture Capital, 50 J. Fin. 1461, 1461-62 (1995) (explaining operation of staged
financing).
50. See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27J. Fin. Econ. 473, 475 (1990) (reporting venture capital funds invest onethird of their capital in new investments and two-thirds in later round financing of
companies already in their portfolios).
51. Conceptually, the signal can support a separating equilibrium in which only high
quality entrepreneurs will accept the incentive. Low quality entrepreneurs, whose
alternatives are more valuable to them than an incentive contract that requires more talent
than they have in order to be profitable, will not. See Edward Lazear, Salaries and Piece
Rates, 59 J. Bus. 405, 413 (1986) (describing separating equilibrium where least able
workers prefer salary firm, while most able workers prefer piece-rate firm); Sahlman, supra
note 50, at 502 ("The governance structure also helps potential investors distinguish
between good venture capitalists and weak ones.... [G]ood venture capitalists are more
likely. . . to accept ... a compensation system heavily dependent on investment returns.").
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capital fund. In essence, the overwhelming percentage of management's
compensation is dependent on the portfolio company's success. Low salaries are offset by the potential for a large increase in the value of the
entrepreneur's stock, and by the award of stock options to other management members. The performance incentive is further heightened by requiring the entrepreneur and other members of management to accept a
staged vesting requirement on some or all of their stock or stock options.5 2 The vesting requirement gives the portfolio company the right to
purchase a portion of the entrepreneur's or other management's stock,
at a favorable price, if employment terminates prior to a series of specified dates. It also restricts exercise of options until after the manager has
worked at the firm for a specified number of years, following which an
additional number of options become both exercisable and no longer
53
subject to forfeiture if employment terminates.
While aligning the interests of the venture capital fund and entrepreneur in some circumstances, the intensity of these incentives can also
lead to agency costs in others. In particular, the option-like characteristics of the portfolio company's compensation structure can lead the entrepreneur to increase the risk associated with the portfolio company's
future returns, because the venture capital fund will bear a disproportionate share of the increased downside but share only proportionately in the
upside. Thus, the intensity of the performance incentives created by the
compensation structure requires the venture capital fund to monitor the
portfolio company's performance.
The entrepreneur's high-powered incentives to perform are
matched by the venture capital fund general partner's incentives to monitor. The bulk of the general partner's (GP's) compensation comes in the
form of a carried interest-20% of the venture capital fund's ultimate
profits is a common figure-distributed to the GP when realized profits
54
In effect, the GP reare distributed to the investor limited partners.
ceives an option on 20% of the gain in the portfolio company's value.
Given the high variance associated with startup company performance,
that option will be very valuable. Most important, by monitoring the entrepreneur, the GP can influence the outcome of the events on which he
has an option. Thus, the structure of the GP's incentives provides an

52. See Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital
Contracts, 29 RAND J. Econ. 57, 58 (1998) (explaining pattern of staged vesting). Kaplan
and Str6mberg report that 41% of a sample of early-stage financings contained
entrepreneur vesting requirements. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 1, at 292 (finding
also 48% of first venture capital financings contain founder vesting requirements).
53. Lee F. Benton et al., Portfolio Company Investments: High-Tech CorporationGetting to the Term Sheet, in Venture Capital & Public Offering Negotiation 6-1, 6-19
(Michael J. Halloran et al. eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2009); Sahlman, supra note 50, at 507.
54. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 1, at 91-92 & fig. 5.1 (demonstrating "profits
received by general partners of venture capital fund").
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intense incentive to monitor, which balances the entrepreneur's intense
incentive to perform.5 5
The term structure of the venture capital limited partnership also
gives GPs an incentive to monitor the entrepreneur's performance. The
partnership typically has a fixed term, usually ten years, after which the
fund's assets are distributed to the investors. The result is that at predictable intervals, the investor can assess the GP's performance when deciding whether to reinvest the funds distributed with the GP. The success of
portfolio companies is the most visible indicium of the GP's
performance. 5 6
D. Assessment
The employer of an innovative employee and a venture capital fund
have different capabilities and therefore different assessments of the
value of the innovation that the employee has offered at auction. We
have seen that the employer bids by means of its internal incentive structure.5 7 But this structure is not monotonic; at some point increasing the
internal incentives in order to retain an additional engineer and her innovation creates costs to employer's R&D that are greater than the innovation's value. At that point, overall firm performance decreases as the
intensity of incentives increases. And perhaps in many companies, the
inflection point may come at very low levels of incentive intensity because
the cost of too-high incentives will be spread over the company's entire
R&D effort, while the benefit will be limited to retaining discrete innovations. This likely explains the infrequent use of intrapreneurship strategies, an arrangement by which an employer locates an employee's innovation in a newly created subsidiary and, by giving the employee an
ownership interest in the subsidiary, effectively matches the intensity of
the incentive that the employee would confront through the venture capital financial contract.5 8
By contrast, in venture capital-backed startups, where the GP's intense incentives to monitor match the entrepreneur's intense incentives
to perform, and where the startup company typically has a single project
on whose success the incentives are based, there is no need for property
right perfection. As a result, there are none of the barriers to spillovers
to other projects that plague the use of intense incentives in established
55. See Gilson, Engineering Market, supra note 3, at 1083-84 (explaining incentive
structure of venture capital incentives).
56. This point originates with Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,
67 Harv. Bus. Rev. 61, 68-70 (1989) (analyzing structure of private equity limited
partnership agreements).
57. See supra Part I.B.
58. Denis Gromb & David Scharfstein, Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium 1-2 (NBER,
Working Paper No. 9001, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9001.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).

2010]

LOCATING INNOVATION

905

companies. For the startup, overall performance is increasing in the intensity of incentives.
In the end, this analysis leads one to expect specialization in the location of innovation of the sort we observe anecdotally. As Aoki concluded
with respect to Japanese manufacturing, incremental innovation, such as
process improvements in manufacturing that depend on teamwork and
information sharing, responds to gentler incentives, like stable employment and predictable compensation.5 9 In contrast, intense incentives
matched by intense monitoring fit better with single project efforts, especially in fast-moving technology markets where the first mover advantage
may mean that the race for the next generation of technology has only
one winner. While more detailed study is warranted, this allocation of
innovative activity illustrates the need to understand how the intersection
of an innovation's technology, organizational structure, and financing directs the project's location.
II.

DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION

In an influential book, Clayton Christensen describes a quite different interaction between established companies and early-stage companies
with respect to the location of innovation.60 Christensen focuses on why
established industry leaders fail to anticipate an innovation that devalues
their skills and products, and as a result dilutes their dominant position.
Christensen calls such an innovation a "disruptive" technology. The
problem is not that the industry leaders are bad managers. Indeed, these
companies are extremely well managed, in that they are attentive to their
customers' needs, continuously improve the quality and reduce the prices
of their products, and usually anticipate what their customers will want
before the customers know it themselves.6 1
Instead, the problem arises precisely because the industry leaders are
so good at what they do. Rather than simply extending the existing
method of production, a disruptive technology reflects so sharp a break
with existing products that neither a leading producer nor its sophisticated customers initially see the technology's potential. And because the
market for the disruptive technology is initially so small, a rational manu59. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45 (discussing Japanese success at
incremental innovation).
60. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma (2000).
61. Id. at ix. For example, in a report that addressed IBM's failure to effectively enter
new markets, the diagnosis highlighted IBM's single-minded focus on serving its existing
customers: "The company is preoccupied with current served markets and existing
offerings. Processes were designed to listen intently to existing customers and to focus on
traditional markets. This makes us slow to recognize disruptive technologies and to
recognize new markets." Charles A. O'Reilly III et al., Organizational Ambidexterity: IBM
and Emerging Business Opportunities 20 (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper
No. 2025, and Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 53, 2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1418194 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter O'Reilly et al., Organizational Ambidexterity] (emphasis omitted).
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facturer would ignore the innovation, sensibly concluding that the returns on an investment would not be worth the effort. As a result, a disruptive technology takes root in secondary markets of no interest to the
industry leaders. Later, developments in the disruptive technology allow
it to be generalized to the industry core; dominant firms are then displaced because they cannot respond quickly enough to the change in the
architecture of production.6 2
In Part I we considered one circumstance in which established firms
chose to allow an innovation to go to a startup-the employer sets its
internal incentives at a level such that some employees will pursue their
innovations through a startup. There, however, the problem was not that
the employer did not appreciate the value of the innovation. Rather, the
employer recognized that the incentive intensity necessary to assure that
all employee-inspired innovations remained with the company would reduce the overall efficiency of its existing R&D capacity by more than the
value of retaining the marginal innovation. Such firms made a clear-eyed
calculation that allowed some of their employees to seek financing
through a venture capital firm. In the case of a disruptive technology, an
established firm's decision not to pursue the disruptive technology is also
rational, but only because the innovation's value is not visible when the
decision is made. Put differently, a dominant company passes on many
innovations because it concludes, based on its experience, that they are
not valuable. Sometimes the dominant company turns out to be very
wrong.6 3
Christensen's solution for an established company is interesting in
that it acknowledges that for some types of innovation, organizational
form is critical. In effect, Christensen recommends that the established
company hedge the potential that a technology is disruptive by creating a
separate unit that is matched to the smaller market available to the technology at that time, at a sufficient distance that the incentive problems
62. Christensen examines examples of the phenomenon in connection with disk
drives, electric arc or mini-mill steel producers, and hydraulically activated earth-moving
equipment. Microsoft's reaction to search-based advertising appears to have tracked
Christensen's pattern. In 2000, before Google had perfected the technique, Microsoft had
an early version of the same technology called Keywords. Microsoft shut the product down
after two months out of fear of cannibalizing existing revenue streams. See Robert A.
Guth, Microsoft Bid to Beat Google Builds on a History of Misses, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 2009,
at 1.
63. A related phenomenon involves companies that recognize that a competing
technology has potential; they try to straddle the two technologies, but fail at the task of
simultaneously pursuing the existing technology while embracing the new. Michael L.
Tushman & Charles A. O'Reilly III, Ambidextrous Organizations: Managing Evolutionary
and Revolutionary Change, Cal. Mgmt. Rev., Summer 1996, at 8, 9-10, offer the example
of the transition from vacuum tubes to transistors. The leading vacuum tube
manufacturers either never entered the transistor market or did enter and failed. The
ultimate winners in the transistor market were, as Christensen would predict, the new
companies that worked only with the new technology.
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discussed in Part I are minimized.6 4 If the technology ultimately proves
disruptive, the established company has the resources to grow the small
separate unit quickly.
Other management scholars are more optimistic. Although recognizing the problem Christensen poses, they envision an "ambidextrous"
firm that can "exploit existing assets and positions in a profit producing
way and simultaneously . .. explore new technologies and markets" without the resigned separation Christensen recommends. 65 But regardless
of whether firms can be taught to be switch hitters, 6 6 at this point we are
back to the problem confronted in Part I: How does an established company manage the general problem of keeping innovations without destabilizing the internal incentives for the rest of its business?
Christensen does not specifically address this issue, but the fact that
his recommendation highlights it provides support for the effort under64. Christensen describes the strategy as "a policy of implanting projects to
commercialize disruptive innovations in small organizations that will view the projects as
being on their critical path to growth and success, rather than as being distractions from
the main business of the company." Christensen, supra note 60, at 138.
65. See, e.g., O'Reilly et al., Organizational Ambidexterity, supra note 61, at 17-21
(describing successful effort by IBM to address both markets).
66. At the conference where the paper that gave rise to this Essay was first presented,
comments by Charles Sabel and Bengt Holmstr6m succinctly demonstrated the pessimistic
side. Taking their views together, they argued that firms are good at pursuing known tasks
through hierarchical organizations, but that a hierarchy is not good at reprogramming
itself. Put differently, the dilemma is that either there is no way to systematize
nonincremental innovation-that is, nonincremental innovation is a non-organizational
task-or the firm must figure out a way in which the innovation is not disruptive. Bengt
Holmstr6m & Charles Sabel, Remarks in Response to Ronald Gilson's Working Paper,
Locating Innovation, at the Business Law and Innovation Conference (Oct. 31, 2008).
O'Reilly, Harreld, and Tushman offer IBM as an example of a successfully
ambidextrous company that took a very different tack than the "skunk works" strategy
Christensen recommends. O'Reilly et al., Organizational Ambidexterity, supra note 61, at
19-21. IBM saw the problem as new businesses being marginalized, so it appointed the
head of its software group, a multi-billion dollar business, as vice chair of the corporation
and the full time head of the new business initiative. IBM's senior vice president for
technology then succeeded this individual. In turn, the individuals chosen to lead a
particular new business initiative are not younger managers, but according to IBM "are
very experienced people, who have built big businesses." Id. at 25-26. For example, the
individual chosen to run the new business had previously run IBM's Unix business that had
$4 billion in sales. Id. at 26.
General Electric Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey R. Immelt similarly describes GE's
efforts at ambidexterity. Jeffrey R. Immelt et al., How GE Is Disrupting Itself, Harv. Bus.
Rev., Oct. 2009, at 56. Like IBM's efforts to assign very senior managers to run new,
potentially disruptive projects, GE seeks to elevate the financial and managerial
commitment to the disruptive project, for example by having the project leader "report to
someone high in the organization." Id. at 64.
While this approach may work for IBM or GE, one would be skeptical of whether it
can generalize to other companies, few of whom will have the management depth to move
the head of major businesses to a startup business, or the discipline to assure a reporting
relationship far enough up the corporate hierarchy. Successfully ambidextrous
companies, and switch hitters like Mickey Mantle, may not come along very often.
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taken here. The location of innovation within an alternative firm, or
within an ambidextrous firm whose internal organization is radically
refigured, is endogenous, reflecting the particular confluence of transaction costs, financial contracting techniques, and the substance of the
technology. Christensen identifies another instance where the location
of the technology and the corresponding financing of its development
are outside the universe of established firms. Again, the confluence of
technology, organizational structure, and financial contracting is central
to the tradeoff between established firms and early-stage startup firms.

III. AN

ESTABLISHED COMPANY USING A TECHNOLOGY RACE AMONG
STARTUPS: THE CISCO SYSTEMS' STRATEGY IN THE 1990s

We now consider a third intersection between an established company and a startup firm, which may provide an established company a
different way to avoid Christensen's innovator's dilemma. During the
1990s, Cisco Systems confronted a difficult problem. Cisco specialized in
the hardware and software that supported local and wide area networks.6 7
The company was extremely successful, having grown in fourteen years
from a startup to a point where 65% of LAN networks used Cisco routers.
However, network technology grew in power very quickly and changed
just as quickly-a product life cycle was estimated to be eighteen months
and it was expected that new solutions would double performance at the
same price.68 At any given point, it was hard to predict the path the technology would take; while the problems that would need to be solved were
visible, a variety of technological solutions were possible. And because
markets for network hardware often rewarded the winner of the technology race with significant first mover advantages, being quick was the best
way to avoid being dead. But any single company has limited internal
R&D capacity; it can do some things well and not others, and it can only
do so much. 69 The limited visibility of the direction of the market and
the short product lead time-said to be six months from when the company knew it needed to bring a product to market-meant that Cisco did
not have the time needed to develop all required innovation internally.
And the further away an innovation was from Cisco's core technology, the
greater the risk that the company would lack the organizational capacity
to develop it. Making the wrong bet on the solution in the face of significant first mover advantages could be far more costly than the company
was willing to bear.
67. See generally Charles A. O'Reilly, Cisco Systems: The Acquisition of Technology
Is the Acquisition of People (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Case No. HR-10, 1998)
[hereinafter O'Reilly, Acquisition of Technology].
68. Id.
69. Cisco is said to have done 70-80% of its product development through internal
R&D, although the engineers who had developed many of these products joined Cisco as a
result of an acquisition. Id. at 5.
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Startup and growing early-stage companies provided a way for Cisco
to deal with the need for expertise that it might not already have inhouse. The lack of visibility of the direction of technology reflected the
fact that different solutions were possible to most problems. This is
where early-stage and startup companies provided an opportunity. If venture capitalists funded startups that pursued alternative solutions to the
technology problem, then Cisco could acquire the company that won the
technology race in time to have a product to market when it was
needed.70 To be sure, the price for the winner would be high; competitors might bid, and an initial public offering could provide the winner's
venture capitalists an alternative liquidity event. Cisco's large market
share and its extensive marketing and distribution system, however, gave
it advantages that the focused winner of the technology race could not
match on a standalone basis.71 For the same reasons, Cisco could be expected to pay more to exercise the real option that its strategy entailed:
to wait and see which technology was best and then acquire it.
For present purposes, the interesting point of the Cisco example is
that it frames a different question concerning the efficient location of
innovation as between a startup and an established company. In Part I,
innovation was allocated between an established company and a startup
based on the differential operation of intense incentives in the two environments. Here innovation is allocated based on technological imperative-the ability of the venture capital market to finance a range of alternative solutions to a technology problem and make use of the incentive
intensity of a startup structure, neither of which Cisco could match internally. Consistent with this confluence of technology, organizational structure, and financial contracting, Cisco developed the ability to quickly and

70. John Chambers, Cisco's CEO then and now, described the process in this fashion:
Our ideal acquisition is a small startup that has a great technology product on the
drawing board that is going to come out 6 to 12 months from now. When we do
that, we are buying the engineers and the next-generation product. Then we
blow the product through our distribution channels and leverage our
manufacturing and financial strengths.
Glenn Rifkin, Growth by Acquisition: Cisco's John T. Chambers, The Case of Cisco
Systems, Strategy & Bus., Second Quarter 1997, at 91, 100; see Nicole Tempest, Cisco
Systems, Inc.: Acquisition Integration for Manufacturing 5 (Stanford Graduate Sch. of
Bus., Case No. OIT-26, 2004), available at http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/cases/documents/
OIT26.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Cisco viewed acquisitions as a means to
ensure that it was offering the 'best of breed' product technology.").
71. John Chambers described Cisco's first acquisition in 1993 of Crescendo as follows:
"We took Crescendo's networking product, and within 18 months we had a $500 million
run rate. No small company can go from $10 million to $500 million in 18 months. They
just can't scale. But we could scale because of our distribution, financial, and
manufacturing strengths." Gerry Yemen et al., Cisco: Early if Not Elegant (A) 8 (Univ. of
Va., Case Study UVA-BP-0446, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract907938 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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effectively integrate new acquisitions.72 In effect, Cisco outsourced R&D
to market-based technology races between startups to achieve the basic
innovation, but took on the task itself of commercializing the innovation.

IV. JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN LARGE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
In this Part we consider the pattern of joint ventures between small
biotech companies and large pharmas to develop new drugs.7 3 As in the
Cisco case, this final example allocates innovation to a small company
and commercialization to an established company. It differs in that the
Cisco strategy contemplated sequential cooperation, the acquisition occurring only after the technology is developed, with the incentive structure driving that development supplied by the early-stage company and
the market. The large pharma/small biotech joint ventures, however,
contemplate a cooperative arrangement from the beginning, which requires developing an organizational structure to govern that cooperation.
Two important background facts place the large pharma/small biotech joint ventures in context. These concern the costs and risks associated with developing a new drug and the very large change in technology
that gave rise to the new generation of biotech firms. Consider first the
costs and risks associated with new drug development. 74 The initial
screening of potential drug candidates and the work that precedes the
commencement of clinical trials takes some three to six years. During
that period, the number of compounds examined runs from 5,000 to
10,000, which ultimately yields a small number that warrant scientific and
animal testing. An application for an Investigational New Drug is then
filed with the FDA. If approved, clinical testing on humans can begin,
which takes another six to seven years. That period is broken down into
three test phases, the first involving fewer than 100 persons, the second
between 100 and 500, and the third between 1,000 and 5,000. If the drug
passes these tests, the sponsoring company files a New Drug Application
("NDA"). FDA review of the NDA can take another six months to two
years. If the FDA approves the NDA, the drug can be brought to market.
Out of 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that are initially screened, it is estimated that only 250 survive preclinical testing,7 5 and the FDA ultimately
72. The ability to integrate was particularly necessary for the Cisco incentive system.
The need for integration is stressed in O'Reilly, Acquisition of Technology, supra note 67,
at 7-9; Tempest, supra note 70, at 15; Yemen et al., supra note 71, at 15.
73. See generally Robinson & Stuart, Financial Contracting, supra note 9 (describing
pharmaceutical joint ventures between small biotech companies and mature pharmas).
74. This account of the approval process draws on Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note
10, at 468 (describing new drug approval process), and Patricia Danzon et al., Productivity
in Pharmaceutical-biotechnology R&D: The Role of Experience and Alliances, 24 J.
Health Econ. 317, 318 (2005) (same).
75. Nat'l Inst. of Health, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., A Plan to Ensure
Taxpayers' Interests Are Protected, pt. D, § 1 (2001), available at http://www.nih.gov/
news/070l01wyden.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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approves only about 20% of drugs that begin human testing. After receiving this approval, the drug's commercial success can finally be
determined.7 6
The expense of the process is consistent with its length. The average
cost of drug development, from initial R&D through FDA approval, but
excluding commercialization costs, was estimated in 2003 at $802 million,
using even earlier data.7 7 Taking into account the time value of money,
the scientific risk associated with securing approval, and the commercial
risk that even approved drugs will not have sufficient sales to provide a
return on investment, new drug development presents a daunting
challenge.
The second background fact that puts large pharma/small biotech
firm alliances in context is the dramatic change in the underlying science
that gave rise to them. By the early 1980s, it became apparent that advances in biotech required large pharmas to develop skills quite different
than the chemistry-based science that had previously driven pharmaceutical research. 7 8 Those skills were found in small, early-stage firms, typically formed by university-affiliated scientists. 7 9 Forming alliances with
these smaller, research-oriented companies provided quicker access to
this knowledge than the pharmas developing the capabilities in-house8 o

76. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22J. Health Econ. 151, 165 (2003).
77. Id. at 166.
78. See, e.g., Sean Nicholson et al., Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances as a Signal of
Asset and Firm Quality, 78J. Bus. 1433, 1434 (2005) ("[B]iotech firms pioneered new drug
discovery technologies . . . whereas traditional pharmaceutical companies have superior
."); Walter W. Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the
expertise in chemistry .
Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 197, 202 (1996)
[hereinafter Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration] ("But Biotech proved to be, in
Schumpeterian terms, a competence-destroying innovation because it built on a new
science base (molecular biology and immunology) that differed significantly from the
knowledge base (organic chemistry and its clinical applications) of the mature
pharmaceutical industry." (citation omitted)); Nadine Roijakkers & John Hagedoorn,
Inter-firm R&D Partnering in Pharmaceutical Biotechnology Since 1975: Trends, Patterns,
and Networks, 35 Res. Pol'y 431, 444 (2006) (noting growth in alliances "primarily caused
by the need of large pharmaceutical companies to access a recent explosion of
biotechnological knowledge"); see also Louis Galambos & Jeffrey L. Sturchio,
Pharmaceutical Firms and the Transition to Biotechnology, 72 Bus. Hist. Rev. 250, 260-76
(1998) (recounting big pharmas' move into biotechnology).
79. See Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration, supra note 78, at 199-201
(describing distribution of expertise); Walter W. Powell et al., Organizational and
Institutional Genesis: The Emergence of High-Tech Clusters in the Life Sciences, in The
Emergence of Organization and Markets (J. Padgett & W. Powell eds., forthcoming 2010)
available at http://academic.reed.edu/sociology/faculty/whittington/Powell_Packalen
Whittington_2010.pdf (manuscript at 14-15, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Powell et al., Institutional Genesis] (same).
80. See, e.g., Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration, supra note 78, at 203
(describing expertise in small biotech companies).
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and, in turn, took advantage of the pharmas' experience and capabilities
at conducting human testing and running the FDA licensing gauntlet.8 1
The large pharma/small biotech joint ventures nicely illustrate how
the intersection of technology, organizational structure, and financial
contracting dictate the location of innovation. The development of new
drugs based on biotechnology required a combination of skills-biotech
on the one hand and commercialization and FDA experience on the
other-that could not be found in either mature pharmas or in the earlystate biotech. While the new biotech was potentially "disruptive" in the
Christensen sense,8 2 it was not an unexpected success. The potential of
biotech was plainly evident, so large pharmas did not ignore this avenue
of research. Rather, the question was how to secure it.
Here the Christensen analysis is relevant. At least at the outset, the
pharmas did not believe they could be ambidextrous. The characteristics
of biotech research more closely resembled university-based research
than research within the large pharmas. 83 Whether the two research
styles, employing scientists who moved between universities and industry
and often straddled the two, could be housed in the same organization
was thought problematic. 84 In this respect, the analysis tracks our earlier
analysis of the different incentive structures of established and startup
companies.8 5
Consistent with this concern, when the Swiss pharma Roche acquired 56% of Genentech, the iconic biotech company co-founded by
academics Herbert Boyer and Paul Berg, Roche both committed not to
buy the rest of the company without a majority vote of the minority shareholders and left Genentech's headquarters and operations in the San
Francisco Bay Area rather than integrating the biotech company with its
other operations. When Roche bid to acquire the remainder of the
shares in 2008 over Genentech's objection, concerns about the impact of
the acquisition on Genentech's "culture" were widespread, and Roche

81. See, e.g., Nicholson et al., supra note 78, at 1434 (citing large pharmas'
capabilities with FDA process as cause of alliances).
82. See supra Part II (discussing Christensen's argument that inability to recognize
disruptive technology's potential contributes to industry leader displacement).
83. See Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration, supra note 78, at 199-200
(describing this resemblance).
84. For example, in 1986, Eli Lilly, a large Midwestern pharma, acquired Hybritech, a
San Diego-based early-stage biotech company, for $300 million. The outcome of the
acquisition was described as follows: "Within one year, no Hybritech employees remained
with Lilly, but more than 40 San Diego biotech firms were subsequently founded by former
Hybritech employees.... A senior scientist at Hybritech quipped that the merger 'was like
"Animal House" meets "The Waltons."'" Powell et al., Institutional Genesis, supra note 79
(manuscript at 29-30) (citations omitted).
85. See supra Part I.C.
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again committed to leave Genentech in San Francisco rather than inte86
grating, to the end of retaining Genentech's culture.
The same kinds of concerns also may have counseled against a Ciscolike strategy. Recall that Cisco's strategy was to rely on the market to
motivate a technology race. But once having bought the winner, Cisco
would quickly and fully integrate the acquired company, including replacing the acquired company's incentive system with that of Cisco. 8 7 In
the case of biotech, especially in the early years, the culture gap, including differences in the incentive structures of biotech and large pharmas,
was too large for the Cisco acquisition and integration strategy.88
If the technology differences between biotech and large pharmas
made acquisitions generally unattractive, then the capabilities of the two
types of companies would have to be combined outside both of the existing entities. This meant that the organization of the joint venture
would be contractual. The problem of crafting the contract was daunting. As Gilson, Sabel, and Scott put it, "The inability of the parties to
specify ex ante the nature of the product to be produced or its performance characteristics means that the terms of performance will be determined by the very governance process the contract creates."8 9 The result
is a structure that contemplates collaboration through a joint committee
that shapes the research agenda and resolves disputes, but without specifying legally enforceable provisions that delineate the parties' actual conduct or the course of the research.
That pattern shifts once the research effort identifies a drug candidate and uncertainty is reduced. Instead of contractual provisions that
are directed at process rather than outcome, we then observe explicit allocation of property rights in the drug compound through a set of nested
options: The pharma has the option to go forward with clinical testing at
its expense, and if the tests are successful, the biotech firm receives a
royalty right. If the pharma does not go forward with the testing, the
biotech firm regains the technology. Thus, we observe a braiding of implicit contracts supported by an explicit governance arrangement that allows the parties to learn about each other's capabilities and capacity for
cooperation. The parties can then carry out the research design developed through that initial cooperation and explicit options on the tech86. See, e.g., Lex Column, Roche Bottom Prices, Fin. Times (Asia), Jan. 31, 2009
("[Bly going hostile [Roche] might also damage the culture and risk alienating, and so
losing, some of the independently minded scientists who built Genentech.").
87. See O'Reilly, Acquisition of Technology, supra note 67, at 7-9 (describing Cisco's
integration strategy).
88. Cisco's strategy relied on quick and thorough integration of the acquired earlystage company into Cisco to allow Cisco to commercialize the acquired company's
technology through Cisco's product lines-as the CEO of Cisco put it, to "blow the
product through our distribution channels and leverage our manufacturing and financial
strengths." Rifkin, supra note 70, at 100.
89. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 10, at 435. The authors discuss in detail the
structure of a particular large pharma/small biotech company joint venture. Id. at 467-71.
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nology once a drug candidate is identified.9 0 In turn, the same governance provisions develop both parties' reputations for the capacity to
successfully collaborate in these relationships, which facilitate their entering into similar arrangements with other companies.9 1
Finally, the financial contracting arrangements observed in large
pharma/small biotech company joint ventures reflect the simultaneous
determination of organizational structure and financial contracting in
light of the technology involved. Lerner and Merges suggest that, during
the 1990s, more funding was provided to biotech companies through
joint ventures and strategic alliances than from venture capital, initial
public offerings, or secondary offerings of stock.9 2 This allocation is
hardly surprising. Equity financing through venture capital provides a
sensible form of financial contracting for early-stage biotech companies
while research efforts identify drug candidates. At that stage, uncertainty
makes it difficult to base payment to the biotech company largely on performance. The biotech company also needs assurance that the large
pharma will have the proper incentives when they decide whether to incur the large costs associated with pursuing FDA approval. In turn, the
FDA approval process, especially regarding human testing, involves levels
of costs and time that are inconsistent with the venture capital funding
structure. Recall that the investment required for a single compound to
get through the process was on average $800 million based on pre-2003
data, an amount too large for venture capital funds to provide, and that
the process takes some twelve years, too long to be feasible for a venture
capital fund whose term is typically limited to ten years.9 3 Thus, we observe a combination of venture capital and joint venture financing that
reflects the nature of the technology being financed and the organizational structure through which the product is carried out.
CONCLUSION

The effort here has been to describe the combination of forcestechnology, organizational structure, and financial contracting-that, refracted through the prism of transaction and information costs, combine
to influence the allocation of innovation either to an established com90. See id. at 492-94 (discussing braiding of explicit and implicit contracts in large
pharma/small biotech joint ventures).
91. See David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of
Strategic Alliances, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 242, 243 (2007) (discussing how reputation,
measured by centrality within network of companies, affects contractual arrangements
between joint venture partners).
92. Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An
Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. Indus. Econ. 125, 128 tbl.1, 129
tbl.2 (1998). The authors also report thatjoint venture/alliance funding in 1995 exceeded
the sum of the next three largest sources of funds for biotech companies. Id.
93. See Gilson, Engineering Market, supra note 3, at 1071 (noting typical ten-year
term); supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (describing prohibitive time and cost
associated with FDA approval).
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pany to be financed by retained earnings or the company's credit, to an
early-stage company with financing provided through venture capital, or
to ajoint venture of early-stage and established companies. The goal is to
develop a better understanding of how innovative activities are distributed across the economy. We considered four patterns where developing
an innovation is at the interface of established and startup or early-stage
companies: (1) when an established company employee with an innovation will pursue the innovation through a startup; (2) when an established company may face the threat of a disruptive technology pursued by
a smaller company; (3) when an established company outsources particular R&D projects to a technology race among venture capital-funded
early-stage companies; and (4) when an innovation is located between an
early-stage biotech company and a large pharma through a joint venture
or strategic alliance. In the past, scholarship has largely focused on the
arrangements associated with a particular location of innovation. Here
the focus has been on the determinants of the allocation of innovation
across locations, with the hope that positive understanding of that allocation leads to normative implications for those charged with engineering
the transactions giving rise to innovation.
Figure Two depicts a preliminary characterization of our effort to
endogenize the location of innovation by labeling the axes on the Innovative Plane in Figure One. The axes now reflect the central elements that
animated the discussion of each of the innovations whose location posed
a choice between a small early-stage company and a large mature company. The "Organizational Structure" axis reflects the relationship between organizational size and incentive intensity: Smaller, focused companies can sustain more intense incentives. The "Technology" axis
reflects the difference between incremental and disruptive innovation.
Finally, the "Financial Contracting" axis moves between internal financing and venture capital financing. As an illustration, Figure Two shows a
high-tech startup at a plausible location on the Innovation Plane-small
firm, intense incentives, less incremental innovation, venture capital financing. Even so simple a depiction highlights this Essay's thesis: understanding the interaction among technology, organizational structure, and
financial contracting is central to understanding the location of
innovation.
In concluding, it is important to note three limits to the effort. First,
the range of innovation patterns discussed is quite limited. I believe that
the same framework-the endogeneity of technology, organizational
structure, and financial contracting on the allocation of innovation-will
have broader application than the interface between early-stage companies and established companies considered here. Nonetheless, that inquiry, as well as the more detailed examination of the locations of innovation we did consider, remains to be undertaken. For example, I have
limited my analysis here to settings that share the common characteristic
of the choice between locating innovation in a mature or early-stage com-
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pany. I expect the same analysis could be applied to the interface between university- and commercially-located innovation.
Second, at any given point in the locational space, there will be overlap. No response to a particular cluster of attributes is exclusive; depending on the particular characteristics of an individual company and the
nature of the particular technology, a range of organizational techniques
may work. For example, some companies will successfully manage intense incentives without negative spillovers to its existing R&D efforts
even though the central tendency will push in the direction of letting
some innovations go. 9 4 Thus, the goal is to understand the forces that
underpin the observed central tendency, which then can be employed to
understand the variance in practice.
Finally, the analysis has been largely static, even though the market
for innovation is, tautologically, dynamic. For example, the vertical disin-

94. Bengt Holmstr6m and John Roberts make this point in a more general fashion.
From their perspective, the boundary of the firm is dictated by a mix of problems and
responses, which will differ depending on particularized circumstances. Bengt Holmstr6m
& John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 73, 75 (1998)
("[OJwnership patterns are responsive to, among other things, agency problems, concerns
for common assets, difficulties in transferring knowledge, and the benefits of market
monitoring.").
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tegration of the supply chain 95 allows a startup to outsource capital-intensive functions like manufacturing and assembly to contract manufacturers
and chip fabricators. This outsourcing dramatically reduces the amount
of capital that must be raised, and thereby provides another source of
financing for innovation. Similarly, the evolution of biotech may come to
broaden the range of organizational structures in which it can be effectively carried out. The Roche acquisition of Genentech and other acquisitions of biotech companies by large pharmas will test this conjecture.

95. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 10, at 438-44 (describing reduction in levels
of vertical integration in manufacturer supply chain).
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